The AI Threat Landscape Beginner
Understanding the threat landscape is the foundation of effective threat modeling. This lesson maps the categories of attacks targeting AI systems, examines standardized threat taxonomies, and reviews real-world incidents that demonstrate the practical risks of deploying AI without adequate security measures.
Categories of AI Threats
AI threats can be organized into several broad categories based on the attacker's goal and the stage of the ML lifecycle they target:
| Category | Attack Stage | Attacker Goal | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evasion | Inference | Cause misclassification | Adversarial perturbations on images |
| Poisoning | Training | Corrupt model behavior | Injecting malicious samples into training data |
| Privacy | Inference | Extract sensitive information | Model inversion, membership inference |
| Theft | Inference | Steal model IP | Model extraction via API queries |
| Abuse | Deployment | Misuse AI capabilities | Generating deepfakes, automated attacks |
| Supply Chain | Development | Compromise dependencies | Backdoored pretrained models, poisoned datasets |
OWASP Machine Learning Top 10
The OWASP ML Top 10 provides a standardized ranking of the most critical security risks for machine learning applications:
| Rank | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ML01 | Input Manipulation | Adversarial inputs crafted to cause incorrect predictions or bypass security controls |
| ML02 | Data Poisoning | Corrupting training data to embed backdoors or degrade model accuracy |
| ML03 | Model Inversion | Reconstructing training data or sensitive features from model outputs |
| ML04 | Membership Inference | Determining whether specific records were used to train the model |
| ML05 | Model Theft | Extracting or replicating a proprietary model via query access |
| ML06 | AI Supply Chain | Compromised pretrained models, libraries, or datasets from third parties |
| ML07 | Transfer Learning Attack | Exploiting vulnerabilities inherited from pretrained foundation models |
| ML08 | Model Skewing | Manipulating data distribution to shift model behavior over time |
| ML09 | Output Integrity | Tampering with model outputs or confidence scores after inference |
| ML10 | Model Poisoning | Direct modification of model weights or architecture during deployment |
MITRE ATLAS Framework
MITRE ATLAS (Adversarial Threat Landscape for AI Systems) extends the ATT&CK framework with AI-specific tactics and techniques. It organizes threats across the adversary lifecycle:
Key ATLAS Tactics
- Reconnaissance - Gathering information about the target AI system, its architecture, and training data
- Resource Development - Building adversarial tools, datasets, and surrogate models
- Initial Access - Gaining access to training pipelines, model registries, or inference APIs
- ML Attack Staging - Preparing adversarial inputs, poisoned data, or extraction queries
- ML Model Access - Querying the model to extract information or test adversarial inputs
- Exfiltration - Extracting model weights, training data, or sensitive predictions
- Impact - Degrading model performance, causing denial of service, or manipulating outputs
Real-World Attack Case Studies
Autonomous Vehicle Evasion
Researchers demonstrated that small stickers placed on stop signs could cause autonomous vehicle vision systems to misclassify them as speed limit signs. The perturbations were imperceptible to human drivers but consistently fooled deep learning models, highlighting the gap between human and machine perception.
Chatbot Manipulation
Microsoft's Tay chatbot was deployed on Twitter and within 24 hours was manipulated by coordinated users into generating offensive content. This demonstrated how adversarial users can exploit the learning mechanisms of AI systems through targeted interactions.
Model Extraction via API
Researchers showed they could replicate the functionality of cloud-based ML models by systematically querying their APIs and using the responses to train substitute models. The extracted models achieved near-identical accuracy at a fraction of the training cost.
Building AI Threat Intelligence
Effective threat modeling requires ongoing threat intelligence gathering. Key sources include:
- Academic research - ML security conferences (NeurIPS, ICML, IEEE S&P) publish new attack techniques regularly
- MITRE ATLAS case studies - Documented real-world incidents with tactics and techniques mapped
- CVE databases - Vulnerabilities in ML frameworks (TensorFlow, PyTorch, scikit-learn)
- Industry reports - Gartner, NIST, and ENISA publish AI security guidelines and threat assessments
- Bug bounty programs - Organizations running AI-specific bug bounties reveal common vulnerability patterns
Ready to Apply STRIDE?
Now that you understand the broad threat landscape, the next lesson teaches you how to apply the STRIDE framework systematically to AI systems for structured threat identification.
Next: STRIDE for AI →Ready to Go Deeper?
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